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Abstract
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tax perspective. We then examine empirically ESPP participation using administrative data from
1997-2001 for a large health services company that employs approximately 30,000 people. The picture
that emerges from the analysis of these data suggests that there is substantial non-participation in these
plans even though all employees could increase gross compensation through participation. We discuss a
number of potential explanations for non-participation.
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individual and corporate tax treatment of ESPPs and the circumstances under which ESPPs will
be preferred to cash compensation from a purely tax perspective. We then examine empirically
ESPP participation using administrative data from 1997-2001 for a large health services
company that employs approximately 30,000 people. The picture that emerges from the analysis
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employees could increase gross compensation through participation. We discuss a number of
potential explanations for non-participation.

Gary V. Engelhardt
Department of Economics and
Center for Policy Research
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
426 Eggers Hall
Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY 13244
gvengelh@maxwell.syr.edu

Brigitte C. Madrian
Department of Business and Public Policy
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
3620 Locust Walk, Suite 1400
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
bmadrian@wharton.upenn.edu

Introduction
There has been great interest recently in the use of stock-based compensation in American
companies. Although there is an older literature on employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs)
and an emerging one on stock options (see Murphy, 1999, for a recent review), very little
research has been done on employee stock purchase plans (ESPP). An ESPP is a tax-subsidized
saving vehicle that allows a worker to use after-tax income to purchase company stock, often at a
discount. For employees in most plans, the primary tax advantage comes from the fact that if the
shares are held long enough, the discount on the stock gets taxed as capital gains rather than as
ordinary income. Because many of the tax advantages are contingent upon the plan being
offered broadly within a firm, ESPPs potentially represent a much broader vehicle for company
stock ownership than stock option plans typically targeted to top executives and key employees.
Indeed, the National Center for Employee Ownership (2001a) estimates that over 15 million
American workers are eligible for ESPPs.
We make three contributions in this paper. First, we describe the institutional features and
parameters association with ESPP plan design. 1 Second, we describe the corporate and personal
income tax treatment of ESPPs, and analyze the circumstances under which employers and
employees will jointly prefer compensation through an ESPP relative to cash from a purely tax
perspective. Finally, we exa mine empirically patterns of ESPP participation and contributions
using administrative data from 1997-2001 for a large health services company.
There are two principal findings. First, compensation through a tax-qualified ESPP, the
dominant type offered, appears to be less advantageous from a pure tax perspective than through
a non-qualified ESPP or cash, unless corporate tax rates are substantially below the top statutory
rate and there is substantial share price appreciation. Given that tax-qualified ESPPs are the
dominant type of plan, this suggests that non-tax considerations play a significant role in the
decision to provide these plans. Second, for most plans, ESPP participation is essentially a risk-
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free way to increase gross compensation for the employee, yet participation is only about 40
percent at the company we analyze. This suggests that a substantial fraction of employees are
either liquidity constrained, do not fully understand these plans, or face non-trivial transactions
costs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out the basic institutional features of and
facts about ESPPs. Section 2 discusses the personal and corporate income tax treatment of
ESPPs, respectively. In Section 3 we then analyze the joint impact of personal and corporate
taxes on the employer provision of ESPP. Section 4 provides an empirical analysis of ESPP
participation and contributions at a single large firm and considers a number of potential
explanations for the substantial non-participation that is observed. There is a brief conclusion.

1. ESPPs: Features and Facts
An ESPP is an employer-sponsored plan that allows employees to purchase company
stock with after-tax income. In a typical ESPP plan, employee contributions to the plan are
accumulated by payroll deduction over a 6- month offering period. At the end of the offering
period, contributions are used to purchase shares of the employer’s stock at a 15% discount off
of the market price of the stock at either the beginning or the end of the offering period,
whichever is lower.
Although this is the description of a “typical” ESPP plan, there are many ESPP plan
design parameters that vary across firms. For example, although the vast majority of plans
accumulate employee contributions smoothly over time through payroll deduction, some plans
allow employees to purchase shares with cash outright. 2

The period over which this

accumulation is done, the offering period, is specified in the company’s plan description.
Although almost half of companie s with ESPPs have a bi-annual (6- month) offering period, this
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period can be as short a 3 months or as long as 27 months (the maximum legal time limit for
most plans). 3 In all plans, employees are permitted to purchase shares at the end of the offering
period.

In addition, plans with sufficiently long offering periods may specify intermediate

purchase dates. For example, the offering period may be one year, composed of two biannual
purchase periods. 4
A key plan parameter is the purchase price of the company stock. Although some plans
use the fair market value on the purchase date as the purchase price, over three-quarters have
what is known as a “look-back” feature, in which the purchase price is the minimum of the fair
market value at the beginning and end of the offering period. 5 In addition, the employer may
offer the shares at a discount legally limited to be no more than 15 percent applied to the
minimum price from the look-back. Naturally, a plan with a discount and a look-back feature can
result in a significant gain at sale when stock prices rise during the offering period. The National
Center for Employee Ownership, or NCEO (2001b), found that 86 percent of ESPP plans offered
employees the full 15 percent legal maximum discount on the purchase price of the stock, 6
percent offered a 10 percent discount, and only 8 percent offered no discount. 6
More complicated ESPPs have a “reset” provision, in which if the stock price falls by the
end of the purchase period, the plan automatically withdraws the employees’ accumulated
payroll deductions for that period, and rolls them into the next offering period. This ensures the
lowest purchase price to the employee. Some ESPPs also allow employees with accumulated
payroll deductions to individually withdraw those funds before the end of the offering period.
Usually when this occurs, the plan stipulates the employee is no longer eligible to purchase in
that period, and, in some plans, may have to sit out subsequent offering periods before becoming
eligible again. 7
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2. Tax Treatment of ESPPs
The tax treatment of ESPPs depends on whether the plan is a qualified of nonqualified
plan. NCEO (2001b) reported that 77 percent of ESPP plans were qualified. A qualified plan,
often referred to as a “423 plan,” must comply with the rules spelled out in Section 423 of the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC). 8 These rules require that only the employees of the company,
parent company or subsidiaries may participate in the plan, and the right to buy company stock is
non-transferable. However, employees who own five percent or more of voting power (for all
classes of stock of the company, parent, and subsidiaries) are not eligible for the plan. At its
9

discretion, the plan may further legally exclude from participation highly- compensated

employees as defined in IRC Section 414, employees with less than two years of tenure, and
employees who work fewer than twenty hours per week or five months per year. 10 In practice,
however, these exclusions do not appear frequently. For example, NCEO (2001b) reported that
98 percent of plans allowed employees with less than two years of service to participate and 68
percent of plans allowed part-time employees to participate.
Beyond these allowable limits on participation, all employees must, in general, have the
same rights and privileges under the plan. Section 423 limits ESPP purchases to $25,000 worth
of stock (or less) per calendar year, although this will bind for only a small fraction of
employees. Plans may limit further the extent of employee participation, such as the number of
shares an employee can purchase or the fraction of employee compensation that can be allocated
to the ESPP plan, as long as this restriction is applied uniformly across employees. Most plans
limit employee contributions to no more than 10 to 15 percent of compensation, and 71 percent
of plans impose limits on share purchases (NCEO 2001a). Non-qualified plans do not have to
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conform to these rules and typically are targeted to a select subset of employees, much like nonqualified stock options (NQSOs).

2.1. Personal Income Tax Treatment
For a qualified plan (QESPP), the extent of the personal income tax benefit depends on
whether the stock is sold in a qualified disposition. A qualified disposition is one that satisfies
what is known as the 1-2 holding rule: (1) the employee must hold onto the stock for at least one
year after the purchase date, and (2) two years after the beginning of the offering period. If this
condition is met, the gain at sale is decomposed into two parts, taxable ordinary income and
taxable capital gains. Taxable ordinary income is defined as the lesser of (a) the spread between
the fair market value at the time of sale and the purchase price and (b) the discount at the
beginning of the offering period.

The portion that is taxable as ordinary income is subject to

FICA and FUTA taxation as well. The taxable capital gain (or loss) is simply that part of the
gain at sale not treated as ordinary income. 11
Mathematically, we express this as follows. Denote the fair market values of a share of
company stock on the first and last days of the offering period as Pf and Pl , respectively. Let δ
denote the discount off the fair market value, which is legally constrained to be 0 ≤ δ ≤ 0.15 .
With a look-back feature, the purchase (exercise) price, Pe , is
Pe = (1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl ) .

(1)

If the share price falls during the period (and there is no reset provision), the participant
purchases at the discounted last-day share price, otherwise the participant does no worse than
purchasing at the discounted first-day share price. Let c be the employee’s contribution rate

6

made out of after-tax income, but expressed as a fraction of gross earnings y . Then at a
purchase price Pe , the employee will purchase

N=

cy
(1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl )

(2)

shares.
If the shares are sold just when the 1-2 rule is met, denoted as period q , the disposition
amount is Pq N . The total gain from sale is ( Pq − Pe ) N , which can be decomposed on a per
share basis into two parts
min( δPf , Pq − (1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl ))

(3)

and
Pq − (1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl ) − min( δPf , Pq − (1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl )) .

(4)

Equation (3) is the portion of the gain at sale that is taxed as ordinary income, which is the lesser
of (a) the spread between the fair market value at the time of sale, Pq , and the purchase price,
Pe = (1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl ) , and (b) the discount at the beginning of the offering period, δPf .

Equation (4) is the portion of the gain at sale taxed at the long-term capital gains rate.
Participants in a qualified plan may not meet the holding requirements in the 1-2 rule,
and, therefore, trigger a disqualifying disposition. The spread between the fair market value on
the purchase date and the purchase price, Pl − Pe , is treated as cash compensation and is taxed in
the calendar year in which the disposition occurs. The difference between the sale price and fair
market value at purchase, Ps − Pl , is taxed (offset) as a capital gain (loss) at the appropriate
capital gains rate depending upon how long the stock was held. The most common disqualifying
disposition is to buy company stock and sell it immediately after purchase, known as a “sameday sale.”
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For dispositions from a non-qualified plan (NQESPP), the spread between the fair market
value on the purchase date and the purchase price, Pl − Pe , is treated as cash compensation and is
taxed in the calendar year in which the purchase occurs. 12 The difference between the sale price
and the fair market value at purchase, Ps − Pl , is taxed (offset) as a capital gain (loss) at the
appropriate capital gains rate depending upon how long the stock was held.

2.2. Corporate Tax Treatment
At the corporate level, there is also asymmetric tax treatment of QESPPs and NQESPPs.
In an NQESPP, the spread between the fair market value on the purchase date and the purchase
price, Pl − Pe , is treated as cash compensation on which the firm must pay its statutory portion of
the payroll tax. The firm deducts the total compensation cost (cash plus payroll tax) in the tax
year when the purchase occurred when calculating its corporate income tax. For a disqualifying
disposition in a QESPP, the spread between the fair market value on the purchase date and the
purchase price, Pl − Pe , is treated as cash compensation on which the firm must pay payroll tax.
However, the firm deducts the total compensation cost (cash plus payroll tax) in the tax year
when the disqualifying disposition occurred when calculating its corporate income tax.

For a

qualifying disposition in a QESPP, the firm does not get a corporate tax deduction, not even for
the ordinary income the employee ultimately will claim for the personal income tax.

2.3. An Example
Consider a typical QESPP with a 15 percent discount (δ = 0.15 ), look-back, and a 6month offering period. Assume the employee is paid $42,500 annually and (on an after-tax
basis) contributes 5 percent of gross pay to purchase stock, or cy = $2,125 . Let the share price
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be $5 on the first day of the offering period ( Pf = $5 ) and $8 on the last day of the offering
period ( Pl = $8 ). With the discount and look-back, the employee gets to purchase at a price, Pe ,
of $4.25 ( $5.00 × 0.85 ). The total number of shares purchases with the $2,125 contributed is
thus N = 500 .
Assume first that the employee holds the shares 18 months for a qualified disposition.
Let the price at disposition, Ps , be $15, which implies a disposition of $7,500. The total gain at
sale is $7,500-$2,125=$5,375. The discount at the start of offering period was $0.75 per share
( $5.00 × 0.15 ), or $375 ( $0.75 × 500 ). This is less than the total gain at sale, so $375 is taxed as
ordinary income and is subject to FICA and FUTA taxes; the remainder, $5,000 ($5,375-$375),
is taxed as a long-term capital gain. Furthermore, because the shares were held for a qualified
disposition, the employer gets no corporate tax deduction.
Now assume that the shares were disposed of immediately after purchase in a same-day
sale.

In this case, the disposition is $4,000 ($8 × 500 ).

The total gain at sale is $4,000-

$2,125=$1,875, all of which is taxed as ordinary income and is subject to FICA and FUTA taxes.
Because the shares were sold in a disqualifying disposition, the employer gets a corporate tax
deduction for the amount, $1,875, taxed as ordinary income; the employer’s statutory FICA and
FUTA taxes on the $1,875 are deductible as well.

3. Taxes and the Employer Provision of ESPPs
The employer has a choice between offering compensation through cash or an ESPP. To
determine which form is preferred, we consider the tax consequences to the employer and
employee jointly using the global contracting approach of Scholes, et al. (2002). Under this
approach, we compare the net benefit to the employee from two forms of compensation that have
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the same present value after-tax cost to the employer. If one form is tax-preferred by the
employee, it will be jointly tax-preferred.

Because a QESPP in which all dispositions are

disqualifying and an NQESPP are treated effectively the same from the corporate and personal
tax perspectives, a useful point of departure is to compare cash to NQESPP compensation. Later
we consider the tradeoff between an NQESPP and QESPP explicitly.

3.1.1. Cash vs. NQESPP Compensation
Without loss of generality, we begin by assuming that the employer wants to pay the
employee an additional amount of compensation above and beyond current gross earnings y .13
Second, we note that once the employee purchases shares through an NQESPP, there is no
preferential personal capital gains treatment relative to a private purchase by the employee
outside of an NQESPP using after-tax cash compensation, and there are no corporate tax
implications upon sale. Therefore, the decision to offer an NQESPP hinges solely on the amount
and tax treatment of compensation provided to the employee at the time of purchase, and how it
is jointly valued relative to cash. 14
Specifically, the additional compensation m to the employee who contributes cy to the
ESPP is the difference between the fair market value and the exercise price at the time of
purchase, Pl − Pe , multiplied by the number of shares purchased, which by (1) and (2) is


Pl
m=
−1 cy .
 (1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl ) 

(5)

Let τ cg be the marginal tax rate on long-term capital gains, τ O be the marginal tax rate on
ordinary income, τ P be the marginal payroll tax rate, and τ C the corporate tax rate. In an
NQESPP, m is treated as cash compensation on which the firm must pay its statutory portion of
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the payroll tax, which is deductible, so that the total net compensation cost to the firm on the last
day of the offering period is (1 − τ C )(1 + τ p )m .

In present value, this is equal to

(1 − τ C )(1 + τ P ) m[1 + (1 − τ C ) rC ]− ( l− f ) on the first day of the offering period, where rC is the

corporate gross rate of return. On a present value after-tax basis, the employer is indifferent to
paying m through an NQESPP on the last day and m′ in cash compensation on the first day of
the offering period, where

m ′ = m[1 + (1 −τ C ) rC ]− ( l− f ) ,

which would cost the firm

(1 − τ C )(1 + τ P ) m[1 + (1 − τ C ) rC ]− ( l− f ) as well.

After payroll and ordinary income taxes, the employee values m′ in cash on the first day
of the offering period as (1 −τ P − τ O )m′ , but values m in deferred compensation on the last day
of the offering period as (1 −τ P − τ O )m[1 + ρ ] − (l − f ) , where ρ is the employee’s discount rate.
Technically, this discount rate is the sum of the pure rate of time preference from period f to l
and the opportunity cost to the employee of foregoing the use of the contribution cy during the
offering period.

As long as this discount rate exceeds the net corporate rate of return,

ρ > (1 −τ C ) rC , the employee will prefer the compensation paid in cash.

3.1.2. NQESPP vs. QESPP
Recall that the employer does not get a corporate tax deduction for compensation of m
paid through a qualifying disposition in a QESPP, but is able to deduct m at purchase in a
NQESPP. This means that the employer is indifferent between paying compensation of m
through a QESPP to m /[(1 + τ P )(1 − τ C )] through an NQESPP.

For compensation of m in a

QESPP, if the shares are sold just when the 1-2 rule is met, then from (2)-(4) the present after-tax
value to the employee at q is
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 min( δPf , Pq − (1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl )) cy 

 (1 − τ O − τ P ) +
(1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl )


 Pq − (1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl ) − min( δPf , Pq − (1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl )) 
cy  (1 − τ cg ).

(1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl )



(6)

The first term in square brackets is the portion of the gain at sale that is taxed as ordinary income
and the second term in square brackets is the portion of the gain at sale taxed at the long-term
capital gains rate. In contrast, for compensation of m /[(1 + τ P )(1 − τ C )] in a NQESPP, if the
shares are sold at q , the after-tax value at q to the employee is





Pl
m
[1 + (1 − τ C )rC ] ( q−l ) (1 − τ O − τ P ) +
− 1

 (1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl )  (1 + τ P )(1 −τ C ) 



Pq − Pl


m

[1 + (1 − τ C ) rC ] ( q−l )  (1 −τ cg ).


 (1 − δ ) min( Pf , Pl )  (1 + τ P )(1 − τ C ) 


(7)

The first term in square brackets in (7) is the portion of the gain at sale that is taxed as ordinary
income (expressed in period q dollars) and the second term in square brackets is the portion of
the gain at sale taxed at the long-term capital gains rate. Therefore, whether the compensation is
paid through a QESPP versus an NQESPP depends upon under what values of τ cg , τ O , τ P , and
τ C (6) dominates (7), given rC and a share price path.
There are two clear predictions from (6) and (7).

First, a QESPP should become

relatively more desirable as the corporate tax rate falls, because compensation paid through a
QESPP is not corporate tax deduc tible but is through an NQESPP. Second, a QESPP should
become relatively more desirable as the spread between the ordinary and long-term gains rates
widens, and the employee is able to convert a larger portion of ESPP compensation from
ordinary to capital gains income.
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Figure 1 shows how the tax advantage of compensation through a QESPP versus an
NQESPP (defined as the quotient of (6) to (7)), changes with the corporate tax rate, τ C ,
assuming both a fifteen percent discount and a look-back, annual share price appreciation of ten
percent, a profit rate of ten percent, and q − l equal to eighteen months (the minimum required
holding time for a qualified distribution with a six- month offering period). A tax advantage of
greater than one means that the QESPP is preferred to the NQESPP.
Figure 1 here
As noted above, the tax advantage declines as the corporate tax rate rises, holding other
tax rates fixed.

Specifically, the solid line gives the tax advantage for an employee with

marginal tax rates of 28%, 7.65%, and 20% on ordinary income, payroll, and long-term capital
gains, respectively. At the statutory corporate tax rate of 35% the tax advantage is 0.89, which
implies that the personal tax benefit from the compensation paid through a QESPP is 89% of that
if paid through an NQESPP. This employee prefers the QESPP only when the corporate tax rate
falls below 22%. The single-dashed line gives the tax advantage for a high- income employee in
the top income tax bracket and above the OASDI taxable earnings cap, with marginal tax rates of
39.6%, 1.45%, and 20% on ordinary income, payroll, and long-term capital gains, respectively. 15
At the statutory corporate tax rate of 35%, the tax advantage is 0.88 in this case. This emp loyee
prefers the QESPP only when the corporate tax rate is 20% or less. Finally, the double-dashed
line gives the tax advantage for a low-income employee with marginal tax rates of 15%, 7.65%,
and 10% on ordinary income, payroll, and long-term capital ga ins, respectively. At the statutory
corporate tax rate of 35%, the tax advantage is 0.88 in this case. This employee prefers the
QESPP only when the corporate tax rate is 21% or less.
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Figure 2 illustrates how the tax advantage changes as the marginal tax rate on long-term
capital gains changes, using the same parameter values as in Figure 1, except the corporate tax
rate is fixed at 35%. The tax advantage declines as the capital gains rate rises, holding other tax
rates fixed. However, the QESPP is never preferred to the NQESPP by any of the employees
under this parameterization.
Figure 2 here

3.2. Empirical Implications
This analysis of the influence of taxes on the incentives for employers to provide ESPPs
highlights two important issues for empirical analysis. First, QESPPs are offered far more
frequently than NQESPPs (77% of plans vs. 23% as reported by NCEO 2001b), even though the
latter seem to have a greater tax advantage. In contrast, the vast majority of stock option plans,
95%, are non-qualified (Hall and Liebman, 2000). Yet for the three prototypical employees
illustrated in Figure 1, QESPPs are jointly tax-preferred to NQESPPs only when the corporate
tax rate is substantially below the top statutory rate of 35% (in the 20-22% range, depending
upon the employee). Indeed, the assumption of large capital gains associated with 10% annual
share price appreciation helps to drive the relative attractiveness of QESPPs in the figure. If
annual share price appreciation is instead assumed to be 1%, then QESPPs dominate NQESPPs
only when the corporate tax rate is in the 14-18% range (depending on the employee).
This naturally raises the question of why firms even offer QESPPs.

One potential

explanation is some firms do have both a low marginal corporate tax rate (due to low corporate
taxable income) and sufficiently high share price appreciation to make offering a QESPP
desirable from a tax perspective.

In this regard, NCEO (2001b) reports that the top three
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industries in 2000 with ESPPs were software, e-commerce, and semiconductor and electronic
component manufacturing.
Another explanation is that the non-tax benefits of broad-based employee ownership
through qualified plans often cited in the plan administration literature, such as increased loyalty
and retention, are sufficiently large to offset any tax disadvantage relative to a non-qualified
plan. We note, however, that there is nothing in principle that prevents the employer from
offering an NQESPP that is broad-based and uniform across employees and, thus, mimics a
QESPP in design. In practice, there appear to be design differences in the two types of plans.
For example, NCEO (2001a) reported that, even though there is nothing that prohibits the
employer from doing so, most NQESPPs did not offer a discount on the purchase of company
stock, which is common in QESPPs.
The accounting treatment of ESPPs may explain this. Specifically, QESPPs have been
deemed as noncompensatory plans for accounting purposes, such that there is no expense
recognition at grant, exercise, or sale. However, NQESPPs that provide a discount and are not
broad-based may recognize an expense for the amount of the discount (similar to NQSOs granted
in the money prior to 2000).

This potential non-tax cost of NQESPPs may explain both why

NQESPPs typically have not offered discounts and why QESPPs have been the dominant type of
plan.
Second, given that the employer has chosen to offer an ESPP, employee participation
would be predicted to be 100% if all employees were fully informed, financially rational, with
access to perfect capital markets and no transactions costs, because contributing to an ESPP and
disposing of shares in a same-day sale is essentially a risk- free way to increase gross
compensation. To see this, note that the factor in square brackets in (5) is the gross return to the
employee on the contribution if the shares are disposed of in a same-day sale. With a 15%
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discount (δ = 0.15 ), which is typical, this return is 17.6% even with zero or negative share
appreciation during the offering period.

For a six- month offering period, this implies an

annualized rate of return of over 38%, far below the annual interest rate charged on credit card
debt. Moreover, this is the lower-bound on the potential return to ESPP participation—with a
look-back and any positive share appreciation, the actual return can be even greater. Only
employees not fully informed or who were unable to borrow would not find participation
attractive.

4. Empirical Analysis With Company Data
Unfortunately, we do not have data on a large random sample of companies to examine
empirically the impact of taxes on the employer provision of ESPPs, and leave that analysis for
future research.

Instead, in the remainder of the paper, we examine patterns of ESPP

participation and contributions using administrative data from 1997-2001 for a large health
services company that employs approximately 30,000 people.

We use the perfect capital

markets, perfectly informed, no transactions cost model as a point of departure for the analysis of
employee participation conditional on the firm having decided to offer the plan. Not surprisingly
(at least to some readers), we do not find the universal participation in the ESPP plan that this
paradigm would suggest. Because of this, we first layout what employee characteristics are
correlated with participation, and then we outline a number of alternative factors that might
explain the substantial non-participation.

4.1. Company Data Description
The company data come from eight cross-sectional snapshots of all active employees:
June and December, 1997; June and December, 1998; June and December, 1999; June, 2000;

16

and, December, 2001. The data contain basic administrative items such as hire date, birth date,
race/ethnicity, gender, and gross pay.

The data also include variables that capture several

important aspects of employee stock purchase plan participation, although we do not have all of
this information available for some of the early cross sections.

The ESPP data include

participation status, the contribution rate, number of shares held, and for later cross-sections, the
number of shares bought and sold. We also have data on 401(k) participation, such as current
participation status and an individual’s current contribution rate and investment allocation. In
addition, we have data on stock options, which are granted to less than 15% of the company’s
employees, at a single point- in-time.
There are four non-wage/savings programs sponsored by this company. The first is the
401(k) plan. This plan is discussed in greater detail in Madrian and Shea (2001). Company
stock is not an investment option within the 401(k) plan, and employer matching contributions
are not made in the form of company stock.
The second savings plan sponsored by the company is the QESPP. The features of this
company’s employee stock purchase plan are fairly standard. The plan has two annual offering
periods that begin on January 1 and July 1 of each calendar year and are six months in duration.
Employees can contribute to the plan an integer percentage of gross earnings up to a maximum
of 10% through payroll deduction. The plan has both a look-back feature and a discount—the
stock purchase price is 15% off of the lesser of the fair market price at the beginning and the end
of the offering period.

All full-time employees are eligible for the plan, as are part-time

employees working 20 or more hours per week and temporary employees with assignments
lasting more than 5 months. Beginning in 1999, all employees were immediately eligible to
participate upon hire (although they could not actually enroll until the next offering period);
before 1999, there was a 60-day service requirement.
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The third company-sponsored savings plan is an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP).
This plan is not associated with the 401(k) plan and is not voluntary. At year-end, the company
allocates a total number of shares, determined annually on the basis of corporate profitability, to
the ESOP.

These shares are then distributed across employees on the basis of employee

compensation (that is, higher paid employees receive proportionately more shares). Overall,
however, the ESOP is small—the mean value of the ESOP accounts is just over $300—and, in
fact, the ESOP was discontinued toward the end of our sample period.
Finally, the company grants stock options to approximately 4,000 of its 30,000
employees. These tend to be the more highly compensated managerial employees within the
firm. Unfortunately, we do not have very extensive information on the stock options granted to
employees over time, or on when they are exercised. We do, however, have a snapshot of the
stock options held by employees at a single point in time.
The sample used for our analysis is all employees who are ESPP eligible, 401(k) eligible,
and who have been with the company for at least 1 year. We impose the tenure restriction
because the service requirements for both ESPP and 401(k) eligibility changed during the period
covered by our data. Employees with more than one year of tenure, however, were continuously
eligible to participate in both plans over the entire time period. Conditional on having one year
of tenure, almost 99 percent of employees are eligible for both the ESPP and 401(k) plan.
Overall, our sample includes 163,043 person-year observations on 44,943 employees. Table 1
gives summary statistics on the employees in our sample.
Table 1 here
One feature of the compensation structure that changed quite significantly over our
sample period is the switch to automatic enrollment in the 401(k) plan. Prior to 1998, employees
were only enrolled in the 401(k) if they made an affirmative election. Beginning April 1, 1998,
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however, all newly hired employees were automatically enrolled in the plan and required to
contribute 3% of pay unless they actively opted out of participation (a so-called negative
election).

Madrian and Shea (2001) examined in greater detail the impact of automatic

enrollment on 401(k) participation, contribution rates, and investment allocation. While ESPP
participation at this company always has been through an affirmative election, the dramatic
increase in 401(k) participation from automatic enrollment documented in Madrian and Shea
could have affected ESPP participation if employees viewed the 401(k) and the ESPP as
substitute saving vehicles. 16 We discuss this below.

4.2. Participation and Contributions: Basic Facts
Table 2 gives summary statistics on ESPP participation and contribution rates for each
cross-section. Column 1 shows the sample size of each cross-section. Column 2 illustrates that
across all employees, the participation rate, defined as the share of eligible employees having
committed to purchase shares in that cross-section’s offering period (not as having a positive
ESPP share balance) fluctuated between 35 and 38 percent and then rose to almost 44 percent in
December, 2001. During this same period the stock price appreciated significantly. The time
path of shares prices is shown in Figure 1, along with the S&P 500 for comparison. Column 4 of
Table 2 shows that the average contribution rate (conditional on participating) was basically
time- invariant, hovering around 4.6 percent of pay.

Only 7.7% of employees (or 20% of

participants) contributed 10% of pay, the plan limit (this is now shown in Table 2).
Table 2 here
Columns 1-3 of Table 3 show ESPP participation and contribution rates by various
demographic and job characteristics measured in the administrative data: gender, age (less than
30, 30-39, 40-49, and 50 and over), race (white, black, Hispanic, and other/unknown), job tenure
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(1-2 years, 2-3 years, 3-5 years, 5-7 years, 7-10 years, and over 10 years) and gross pay (less
than $20,000, $20,000-$30,000, $30,000-$40,000, $40,000-$50,000, $50,000-$60,000, $60,000$70,000, $70,000-$80,000, and more than $80,000). The first set of rows in Table 3 shows that
ESPP participation is much higher for men than women (47.6% vs. 34.8%), so that being female
is associated with a reduction in participation of 12.8 percentage points. Participation rates are
substantially higher for whites than for blacks, Hispanics, or individuals of another or unknown
race. In particular, blacks have a participation rate that is 16.5 percentage points lower than that
of whites. Finally, the other rows of the table indicate that participation increases monotonically
with age, tenure, and income.
Table 3 here
We include the tabulations on 401(k) behavior for employees hired prior to automatic
enrollment, shown in columns 4-6, as an important comparison. In principle, under the perfect
capital markets, perfect information, no transactions costs model, 401(k) participation also
should be 100% and all employees should contribute to the plan limit, because the employees
can receive the employer match, cash out, pay the early withdrawal penalty tax, and still come
out ahead. This is clearly not the case, as 401(k) participation, though higher than ESPP
participation, is also well below 100%.

As with the ESPP, 401(k) participation is much higher

for men and whites and increases with age, tenure, and income.

The same observable

characteristics that drive ESPP participation also appear to drive 401(k) participation. 17
Because many of the factors associated with ESPP participation are highly correlated
with each other (for example, high- income employees are more likely to also be older, white,
male, and high tenured employees), we next turn to estimating multivariate models to isolate the
independent impact of these demographic characteristics on ESPP participation and
contributions. The primary dependent variable, D c , is a dummy that takes on a value of one if
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the employee commits at the beginning of the offering period to contribute to the ESPP and
purchase company stock at the end of the offering period, and zero otherwise. Let i index
individuals, s states, and t offering periods. Then the baseline specification is
Distc = α ′X ist + βDitauto + γ s + θ t + uist ,

(8)

in which X is a vector of variables explaining the participation decision and includes a constant
along with dummy variables for the categories of demographic and job characteristics shown in
Table 3. The excluded categories are male, age 50 and over, white, job tenure of 1-2 years, and
gross pay less than $20,000. We do not observe marital status in these data. However, we have
the employee’s health insurance election: employee-only coverage, employee plus 1 dependent
(a spouse or child), employee plus 2 dependents (spouse and/or children), or coverage waived.
Because individuals who elected employee-only coverage are predominantly single, we included
a dummy for this health election category in the X vector as a rough control for marital status.
We also included a dummy variable D auto equal to one if the employee was subject to automatic
401(k) enrollment and zero otherwise and a full set of state and offering period fixed effects, γ
and θ , respectively. 18
Column 1 of Table 4 shows the parameter estimates from the linear probability model of
ESPP participation.

Robust standard errors that account for the fact there are multiple

observations on individuals are reported in parentheses. Women have a statistically significant
0.91 percentage point lower probability of participating in the ESPP.

This is, however,

substantially smaller in magnitude than the male- female difference of 12.8 percentage points in
the unconditional ESPP participation rates tabulated in Table 3. This indicates that the simple
tabulations were driven almost completely by other characteristics that are correlated with being
female. Once these other factors are controlled for, women are only slightly less likely to
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participate than men. For similar reasons, the black-white difference of 16.5 percentage points in
Table 3 falls to a statistically significant 7.1 percentage points upon controlling for other
observable employee characteristics. The other major differences between the simple tabulations
and the regression results for participation is that upon controlling for other factors, the impact of
age and tenure is U-shaped, rather than monotonically increasing.
Table 4 here
Columns 2-4 of Table 4 report results from the estimation of the same specification as in
(8), but with the dependent variable measuring the contribution rate,
cist = α ′X ist + βDitauto + γ s + θ t + uist ,

(9)

in which c is constrained by the plan to be an integer percentage of gross pay from 0 to 10
percent. Column 2 shows OLS estimates of the parameters in (9) for all sample individuals,
whereas column 3 shows OLS estimates only for the sub-sample with positive contributions.
Column 4 shows estimates based on a two-limit Tobit model that recognizes the minimum and
maximum contribution rates of 0 and 10 percent explicitly. The results in columns 2-4 indicate
that the demographic and job characteristics drive contributions in a similar manner as
participation in column 1.

4.3. Explanations for Non-Participation
With participation far below 100% and the contribution rate much less than the plan
limit, it is obvious that employees’ behavior is not described well by the perfect capital markets,
perfect knowledge, and no transactions costs model. We focus on four explanations for this
puzzle: liquidity constraints, imperfect plan information, asset choice, and transactions costs.
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4.3.1. Liquidity Constraints
First, it may be that participants are liquidity constrained. Low income and minority
status are correlated with low participation and contributions in Tables 3 and 4. These factors
have been associated closely with liquidity constraints in the previous literature, including Japelli
(1990), Cox (1990), Charles and Hurst (2002), Ladd (1998), and Yinger (1998), among many
others, and might suggest that liquidity constraints are an important reason for less than full
participation.
Although there is no way to assess this definitively in these data, because there are no
clearly delineated measures of liquidity constraints, there are three reasons why such constraints
probably are not the most important factor. First, 62% of ESPP non-participants contributed to
the company 401(k) plan.

This alone suggests that these individuals are not liquidity

constrained. In fact, a fully informed employee would realize that the compensation-maximizing
strategy would be to contribute the limit in the ESPP, engage in a same-day sale, and use the
proceeds to fund the 401(k) contribution and capture the employer match. But employees do not
appear to do this. Indeed, only 10% of 401(k) contributors are limit contributors to the ESPP,
and this may simply indicate a strong taste for saving rather than a pure arbitrage. Second, the
company adopted automatic 401(k) enrollment partway through the sample, which defaulted
many non-401(k) participants into contributing 3% of gross pay annually to the 401(k). If
employees were liquidity constrained, automatic enrollment in the 401(k) should have reduced
participation in the ESPP by making the constraint more binding. However, as Madrian and
Shea (2001) estimated and documented, automatic 401(k) enrollment had no impact on ESPP
participation. Third, recall tha t the worst an employee could do on a annualized return basis for
a riskless sale-day sale of shares purchased through the ESPP is just over 38%. This is far above
the annual interest rate on credit card debt, sometimes thought of as the marginal source of
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borrowing for many households. Finally, the findings that low income and minority status are
associated with lower participation are not unique to liquidity constraints.

Indeed, these

employee characteristics could be correlated with employee plan knowledge and financial
sophistication.

4.3.2. Imperfect Knowledge of the Plan
A second explanation for non-participation is imperfect knowledge of the plan. The
employee simply may not understand well enough the plan features and tax treatment of the
various types of dispositions to make an informed decision on participation. The tax discussion
and equations (1)-(7) above are actually fairly complicated and were based on our reading of
Section 423 of the IRC and related IRS tax regulations. In fact, our reading of the plan design
and administration literature indicated that there was substantial confusion among so-called
experts on the corporate tax treatment of ESPPs. So, it does not seem surprising that employees
might not understand these plans very well. We also note that participation was higher in the
401(k) plan which is less complicated and likely much better understood by the typical
employee. In this regard, during our sample the company offered financial planning seminars to
employees. We obtained the Powerpoint presentation from these seminars, and only one slide
out of thirty was devoted to the ESPP plan, and it came at the end of the presentation. The bulk
of the seminar focused on the 401(k) plan.
Another reason why employees might not participate is that the firm may not advertise
the availability of same-day sales if the objective is to encourage long-term share ownership.
This is similar to why employers often do not advertise the availability of pre-retirement
borrowing against and hardship withdrawals of 401(k) balances.
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4.3.3. Asset Choice
Another potential explanation is that employees do not view the ESPP as a way to
increase compensation, but rather, as a way to incorporate company stock into the savings
portfolio. Because company stock was not an investment option in the 401(k) plan, the easiest
way for most employees to acquire their preferred holdings of company stock is through the
ESPP. To see whether this explanation is valid, we examine the relationship between the receipt
of employer stock options and participation in the ESPP. If participation in the ESPP is driven
by a lack of access to employer stock elsewhere, we would expect participation in the ESPP to
decline with the receipt of employer stock options.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between income and both the fraction of employees
participating in the ESPP and the fraction of employees (primarily managerial) who have
received stock options. 19

Note that the receipt of stock options is strongly correlated with

income—virtually no employees with incomes of less than $40,000 have been granted stock
options. But the relationship between income and the fraction of employees participating in the
ESPP does not appear to change around $40,000 in income when the fraction of emp loyees
receiving stock options starts to increase rather markedly.

The patterns are similar if one

considers the number of options received by employees and not just a binary indicator for
whether not options have been received. Overall, we find little support for the notion that the
ESPP is used by employees as a way to purchase company stock if access to company stock is
not available elsewhere.
Figure 4 here
4.3.4. Transactions Costs
Following the work of Madrian and Shea (2001) on 401(k) participation at this company,
we think that a likely explanation for the lack of universal participation in the ESPP is
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procrastination—many employees delay in signing up for the plan. This procrastination could be
due to transactions costs, either the direct costs of enrollment, or more likely, to the indirect costs
of learning about the plan (and, in particular, why the plan is such a good deal). Alternatively,
this procrastination could arise from the type of self-defeating behavior generated by presentbiased preferences (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a, 1999b; Diamond and Koszegi 2003; Laibson,
Repetto and Tobacman 1998).

5. Conclusion
Most employee stock purchase plans are designed to promote employee stock ownership
broadly in the firm and provide another tax-deferred vehicle for capital accumulation in addition
to traditional pensions and 401(k)s. There are two principal findings from our analysis. First,
compensation through a tax-qualified ESPP, the dominant type offered, appears to be less
advantageous from a pure tax perspective than through a non-qualified ESPP or cash, unless
corporate tax rates are substantially below the top statutory rate and there is substantial share
price appreciation. Given that tax-qualified ESPPs are the dominant type, this suggests that nontax considerations play a significant role in the decision to provide these plans. Second, for most
plans, ESPP participation is essentially a risk- free way to increase gross compensation for the
employee, yet participation is only about 40 percent in the company we analyze, which is quite
puzzling and suggests that a substantial fraction of employees are liquidity constrained, do not
fully understand these plans, or face non-trivial transactions costs.

Clear areas for future

research are estimating the impact of taxes on provision of ESPPs in a random sample of
employers, the impact of capital gains tax changes on the timing of ESPP stock dispositions,
which would require much more detailed data tracking different vintages of purchases and sales

26

of company stock both before and after TRA97 and IRSRRA98, and empirically examining and
testing alternative explanations for non-participation.
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Explanatory
Variable
Dummy if Female

TABLE 1. Sample Means of Selected Variables
Full
ESPP
Sample
Participants
(1)
(2)
.779
.720

ESPP NonParticipants
(3)
.813

Dummy if Age <30

.172

.111

.209

Dummy if Age 30-39

.385

.390

.382

Dummy if Age 40-49

.289

.323

.269

Dummy if Age 50-64

.154

.177

.140

Dummy if 1-2 Years Tenure

.205

.161

.231

Dummy if 2-3 years Tenure

.142

.135

.146

Dummy if 4-5 Years Tenure

.176

.185

.171

Dummy if 6-7 Years Tenure

.107

.122

.095

Dummy if 8-10 Years Tenure

.107

.141

.127

Dummy if 10+ Years Tenure

.238

.257

.227

Dummy if Black

.108

.071

.131

Dummy if Hispanic

.060

.041

.071

Dummy if Other Race

.070

.051

.081

Dummy if Employee Only Health Election

.345

.328

.356

41,410
(31,606)
[33,000]

52,465
(39,944)
[42,350]

34,740
(22,822)
[29,070]

.821

.822

.820

163,695

61,596

102,099

Annual Compensation (dollars)

Dummy if Subject to Automatic 401(k)
Enrollment
Number of Observations

Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample is pooled cross-sectional data from the company
studied and is restricted to individuals who are eligible for the ESPP, the 401(k) and have at least
1 year of tenure with the firm. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses, medians in
brackets.
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TABLE 2. Summary Statistics on ESPP Participation and Contribution Rates
ESPP
Mean ESPP
Mean ESPP
Sample
Participation
Contribution
Contribution Rate
Observation
Size
Rate (%)
Rate (%)
of Participants (%)
Date
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
06/1997
20,896
36.0
1.6
4.5
12/1997
20,333
37.2
1.7
4.5
06/1998
21,808
35.8
1.7
4.6
12/1998
19,189
37.1
1.7
4.5
06/1999
20,350
35.8
1.6
4.6
12/1999
19,824
37.1
1.7
4.6
06/2000
19,829
38.0
1.8
4.7
12/2001
21,466
43.8
2.0
4.7
Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample is restricted to individuals who are eligible for the ESPP, the 401(k) and
have at least 1 year of tenure with the firm.
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TABLE 3. ESPP and 401(k) Participation and Average Contribution Rates
by Demographic Characteristics
401(k) Plan
Employee Stock Purchase Plan
(Employees hired before
(ESPP)
automatic enrollment)
Contribution
Contribution
Participation Contribution rate given Participation Contribution
rate given
Rate
rate
participation
Rate
rate
participation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Sex
Male
Female
Age
<30
30-40
40-50
50-65
Race/Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic
Other/NA
Tenure
1-2 years
2-3 years
3-5 years
5-7 years
7-10 years
10+ years
Income
<$20K
$20-$30K
$30-$40K
$40-$50K
$50-$60K
$60-$70K
$70-$80K
>$80K

47.6%
34.8

2.63
1.47

5.54
4.22

72.0%
67.1

5.39
4.66

7.48
6.94

24.3%
38.1
41.9
43.1

1.02
1.69
1.93
2.19

4.23
4.45
4.60
5.08

47.6%
68.5
73.4
78.5

2.79
4.53
5.33
6.60

5.88
6.62
7.26
8.41

41.2%
24.7
25.8
27.7

1.91
0.83
1.16
1.28

4.62
3.38
4.49
4.61

72.7%
49.9
52.9
55.0

5.26
2.65
3.31
3.88

7.23
5.31
6.24
7.04

29.5%
35.7
39.5
42.8
40.0
40.7

1.35
1.65
1.88
2.03
1.83
1.78

4.58
4.61
4.75
4.75
4.57
4.37

41.5%
56.3
65.9
74.9
77.2
81.7

3.01
3.99
4.55
5.15
5.27
5.94

7.25
7.10
6.91
6.89
6.84
7.28

14.1%
24.9
35.3
46.8
55.8
59.5
63.2
72.0

0.61
0.91
1.40
2.06
2.66
3.07
3.44
4.65

4.35
3.68
3.90
4.41
4.78
5.17
5.44
6.47

39.0%
57.5
71.7
78.0
84.4
87.3
88.3
91.0

2.35
3.37
4.84
5.99
7.17
7.74
7.75
6.97

6.04
5.85
6.75
7.67
8.49
8.85
8.77
7.66

Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample is pooled cross-sectional data from the company studied and is restricted to
individuals who are eligible for the ESPP, the 401(k) and have at least 1 year of tenure with the firm. The sample for the
401(k) plan is further restricted to employees who were hired before the company adopted automatic enrollment in 1998.
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TABLE 4. Baseline Regressions for ESPP Participation and Contribution Rates

Independent
Variables
Female
Age <30
Age 30-40
Age 40-50
Black
Hispanic
Other Race/NA
Employee-only Health Insurance
Tenure 2-3 years
Tenure 3-5 years
Tenure 5-7 years
Tenure 7-10 years
Tenure 10+ years
Earnings $20-$30K
Earnings $30-$40K
Earnings $40-$50K
Earnings $50-$60K
Earnings $60-$70K
Earnings $70-$80K
Earnings >$80K

σ
N

R2

OLS
Participation
(1)
-0.0091
(0.0030)
-0.0773
(0.0041)
-0.0366
(0.0035)
-0.0219
(0.0037)
-0.0714
(0.0035)
-0.0720
(0.0045)
-0.0598
(0.0043)
-0.0060
(0.0024)
-0.0222
(0.0036)
0.0130
(0.0039)
0.0353
(0.0037)
0.0594
(0.0043)
0.0445
(0.0039)
0.1045
(0.0034)
0.1978
(0.0039)
0.2999
(0.0044)
0.3859
(0.0053)
0.4204
(0.0064)
0.4543
(0.0077)
0.5367
(0.0055)
--

OLS
Contribution
Rate
(2)
-0.0032
(0.0002)
-0.0053
(0.0003)
-0.0040
(0.0002)
-0.0032
(0.0002)
-0.0048
(0.0002)
-0.0035
(0.0003)
-0.0027
(0.0003)
-0.0004
(0.0001)
0.0007
(0.0002)
0.0020
(0.0002)
0.0034
(0.0002)
0.0045
(0.0003)
0.0035
(0.0002)
0.0032
(0.0002)
0.0076
(0.0002)
0.0132
(0.0003)
0.0188
(0.0003)
0.0226
(0.0004)
0.0259
(0.0006)
0.0373
(0.0004)
--

OLS
Contribution Rate
Given Participation
(3)
-0.0070
(0.0003)
-0.0061
(0.0005)
-0.0066
(0.0004)
-0.0055
(0.0004)
-0.0077
(0.0004)
0.0005
(0.0006)
0.0002
(0.0006)
0.0000
(0.0003)
0.0046
(0.0004)
0.0043
(0.0004)
0.0051
(0.0004)
0.0050
(0.0004)
0.0041
(0.0040)
-0.0057
(0.0006)
-0.0031
(0.0007)
0.0002
(0.0007)
0.0034
(0.0008)
0.0069
(0.0008)
0.0092
(0.0009)
0.0181
(0.0008)
--

163,044
0.1242

163,044
0.1489

61,332
0.1004

Tobit
Contribution
Rate
(4)
-0.0074
(0.0005)
-0.0194
(0.0008)
-0.0109
(0.0007)
-0.0078
(0.0007)
-0.0182
(0.0007)
-0.0144
(0.0010)
-0.0111
(0.0009)
-0.0012
(0.0005)
0.0011
(0.0007)
0.0053
(0.0007)
0.0097
(0.0007)
0.0135
(0.0008)
0.0105
(0.0007)
0.0236
(0.0010)
0.0418
(0.0010)
0.0589
(0.0011)
0.0730
(0.0012)
0.0807
(0.0013)
0.0873
(0.0015)
0.1092
(0.0013)
.0264
(.0003)
163,044
--

Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample is pooled cross-sectional data from the company studied and is
restricted to individuals who are eligible for the ESPP, the 401(k) and have at least 1 year of tenure with the firm.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant, the dummy for automatic 401(k)
enrollment, and a full set of state and offering period fixed effects (not reported).
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Figure 2. Tax Advantage of QESPP to NQESPP by Capital Gains Tax Rate,
10% Annual Share Price Appreciation
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Figure 3. Monthly Stock Price
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FIGURE 4. Stock Options and ESPP Participation
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Endnotes
1

We do not discuss the corporate finance implications of ESPPs (Hallman and Rosenbloom, 2001), the impact of
taxes on actual dispositions, nor the impact of company stock risk exposure (Mitchell and Utkus, 2002; Poterba,
2003; Muelbrook, 2002; Liang and Weisbenner, 2002).
2
The NCEO (2001b) conducted a survey of 247 companies with stock-based compensation plans in 2000. They
found that only 12 percent of ESPP plans allowed for share purchase with a method other than payroll deduction. A
survey of 100 firms with ESPPs by Hewitt Associates (1998) found similar results.
3
The NCEO (2001b) found that 46 percent of companies with ESPPs had a 6-month offering period, and 11 percent
had a 3-month offering period. The offering period can only exceed 27 months if the purchase price at the exercise
date reflects the market price (that is, there is no discount, as discussed below). In this case, the offering period can
be as long as 5 years.
4
NCEO (2001b) found that only 24 percent of plans allowed for interim purchase dates within the offering period,
and those that did had relatively long offering periods. Eighty-eight percent of the interim purchase periods had a
length of six months.
5
NCEO (2001b) found that 78 percent of plans had a look-back feature in determining the purchase price.
6
As an alternative to these price discounts, in some plans the employer will match all or part of the employee
contributions to the ESPP (although ESPP matches are much less prevalent than 401(k) matches).
7
NCEO (2001b) reported that 82 percent of plans allowed withdrawals prior to the end of the offering period, but
not enough detail was given in the report to know whether these came with penalties, reset provisions, etc.
8
Section 423 plans are not covered by ERISA.
9
10

The company ESPP we analyze below does not exclude highly-compensated employees.
Unlike incentive stock options (ISOs), the excess of the fair market value over the purchase price does not count
as a preference item under the alternative minimum tax (AMT).
12
Therefore, a disqualifying disposition from a QESPP is treated the same as a disposition from an NQESPP for
both personal and corporate taxation, with the only potential difference being the timing of the ordinary income
received for the personal tax and the deduction taken for the corporate tax.
13
Our approach is similar to the approach of Hall and Liebman (2000), who discuss the impact of taxes on the
provision of NQSOs and ISOs. Specifically, the thought experiment here is not to hold the marginal product of
labor constant and potentially re-allocate some of current gross earnings to ESPP compensation, in which case there
might be gross earnings offsets to those employees who value the ESPP the most.
14
An important non-tax concern in ESPP plan administration is the dilution from offering shares at a discount. We
do not explicitly model this cost to the employer, nor do we model any potential benefit to the employer from
increased employee ownership.
15
This line actually lies below the lines for 28% and 15% marginal tax rates on ordinary income, respectively. The
tax value is monotonically increasing in the ordinary income tax rate, holding other tax rates fixed; however, the line
for the 39.6% marginal tax rate has a lower payroll tax rate of 1.45%. If the payroll tax rate were assumed to be
7.65%, the 39.6% marginal tax rate line would lie above the lines for the 28% and 15% rates.
16
Madrian and Shea (2001) noted in their paper that it did not appear that the increase in 401(k) savings observed
following the adoption of automatic 401(k) enrollment was a result of a decline in ESPP saving.
17
One factor that affects 401(k) but not ESPP participation is taxes. A number of papers have estimated the impact
of marginal tax rates on participation in and contributions to tax-subsidized saving vehicles, including Venti and
Wise (1988), Milligan (2002, 2003), Veall (2001), Engelhardt (1994, 1996), Engelhardt and Kumar (2003), and
Cunningham and Engelhardt (2002). We estimated specifications similar to equation (8) below to examine the
impact of taxes on ESPP participation. In particular, we estimated the effect of the spread between the marginal tax
rate on ordinary and capital gains income on participation in and contribution to the ESPP. We calculated the
combined federal-state marginal tax rate on ordinary income using the NBER’s TAXSIM calculator (Feenberg and
Coutts, 1993). The offering periods from January 1997 to December 2001 spanned the capital gains tax changes in
TRA97 and IRSRRA98, as well as the proposed changes in TRRA99 that were not enacted. We used these changes
in the tax treatment of capital gains to identify the effect of taxes on ESPP participation. In none of the
specifications did the marginal tax rate spread affect ESPP participation, and in many specifications the estimated
parameter entered with the incorrect sign. In contrast, similar regressions for 401(k) participation as a function of
the first-dollar marginal tax rate on 401(k) contributions showed strong evidence that participation and contributions
11

41
rose with the marginal tax rate, which was expected given the deductibility of contributions. The results are
available from the authors upon request.
18
We include time effects to account for differences over time in the attractiveness of ESPP participation. For
example, employees may be more wont to participate in the ESPP if the company stock (or stock in general) has
been doing well in the recent past. We include state effects to account for differences across states in the
attractiveness of ESPP participation. For example, holding other factors constant, employees in high cost-of-living
states may face more binding liquidity constraints that make ESPP participation less attractive.
19
Each point in Figure 4 represents 250 employees ordered on the basis of income.

